By Malik Bello Bayewuwon
Military coups have become an unsettling norm in West Africa. In just five years, six successful coups have taken place in the region, each in Francophone countries, signaling a dangerous erosion of constitutional order and regional stability.
The attempted coup in the Republic of Benin on Sunday, December 7, 2025, was therefore not just another headline; it was a direct warning to Nigeria. In the early hours of that day, Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri appeared on Beninese national television to announce the deposition of President Patrice Talon, the closure of borders and the suspension of democratic institutions. Had that attempt succeeded, the consequences for Benin and Nigeria would have been severe.
West Africa is already grappling with widespread democratic backsliding. Five ECOWAS member states (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau) are under military rule, with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) after turning away from regional consensus. These developments have weakened collective security arrangements and empowered violent extremist groups.
The swift response by loyalist Beninese forces, backed by ECOWAS, prevented another constitutional collapse. The regional bloc rightly condemned the coup attempt as an assault on the will of the Beninese people and declared its readiness to deploy its standby force to support the restoration of constitutional order. This intervention was not merely about defending democracy; it was about preserving regional security.
For Nigeria, a successful coup in Benin would have been disastrous. Coups create power vacuums, weaken state control and distract security forces, providing insurgent groups with fresh opportunities to expand. As Nigeria’s Minister of Defence, General Christopher Musa, has warned, the Sahel is already “heating up” as military takeovers worsen insecurity and embolden extremist networks.
Benin shares an 809-kilometre border with Nigeria, cutting across Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Kwara and Kebbi states. The country has already paid a heavy price for instability in neighbouring Sahel states. In 2022, Benin became the first coastal West African country to host a permanent presence of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). Dozens of Beninese soldiers have since been killed, and jihadist influence has spread across border regions such as Alibori and Borgou—dangerously close to Nigerian territory.
The data is alarming. In 2023, Benin recorded the highest increase in jihadist attacks in Africa. By early 2025, fatalities from such attacks had already surpassed 2024 totals and approached 80 per cent of casualties recorded over the previous four years. A successful coup would have accelerated this trend, opening the door for intensified cross-border operations into Nigeria’s southwestern corridor.
Recent history offers clear lessons. The collapse of the G5 Sahel alliance, following a wave of coups, crippled regional counterterrorism cooperation and allowed insurgent groups to move more freely across borders. Nigeria has already felt the consequences through increased infiltration via Niger. A breakdown of the Nigeria-Benin security partnership would have replicated this problem on another front.
The ECOWAS intervention in Benin, therefore, was not an act of interference but a necessary step to prevent a larger catastrophe. By helping to preserve democratic governance in Benin, the region also protected Nigeria from a new and costly security crisis.
Nigeria cannot afford to view coups in neighbouring states as distant events. In a region where insecurity travels faster than diplomacy, the survival of democracy in Benin is inseparable from Nigeria’s own national security.
…Malik Bello Bayewuwon, graduate of history and international studies, could be reached through bellomalik001@gmail.com
